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FEDERAL LAW-THE RIVERS AND HARBORS ACT OF 1899 AND SEC­
TION 1983-GoOD-BYE IMPLIED RIGHTS OF ACTION, HELLO FED­
ERAL EXPRESS? CALIFORNIA v. SIERRA CLUB, 451 U.S. 287 (1981). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In a series of decisions over the last six years,l the United States 
Supreme Court has effectively restricted the availability of the doc­
trine of implied rights of action to plaintiffs alleging federal statutory 
violations.2 After proposing a four-part test in Cor! v. Ash 3 as a 
guide to determine the existence of implied private rights of action 
within a given statute, the distillate of recent decisions had been to 
reduce the four-part test into mere indicia of congressional intent.4 
The practical effect of structuring the inquiry solely to determine leg­
islative intent has been to establish a trend away from finding im­
l. See notes 41 and 78 infra. 
2. This restriction of the doctrine of implied rights of action appears to represent 
merely one aspect of a more pervasive scheme to restrict the availability of federal courts. 
See Note, Implied Private Actions Under Federal Statutes: The Emergence 0/a Conserva­
tive Doctrine, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 429,446 (1976). Specifically, the Supreme Court 
has used the standing doctrine to deny remedies in federal courts to parties seeking to 
enforce their rights. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm., 418 U.S. 208 (1974); United States 
v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974). Further, it has used the doctrine of justiciability to 
deny access to the federal courts. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972). 
3. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). The Court held that an alleged violation of the Federal 
Election Campaign Act, 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1976), must be brought to the cognizance of the 
Federal Election Commission. This administrative feature relegated power to act on 
complaints for injunctive relief for alleged statutory violations to the commission only; 
thus, no private cause of action was held available. The factors that the Court deter­
mined relevant for deciding whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not ex­
pressly providing one were: 
First, is the plaintiff 'one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was 
enacted' . . . that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plain­
tiffl Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, 
either to create such a remedy or deny one? . . Third, is it consistent with the 
underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the 
plaintiffl ... And finally, is the cause one traditionally relegated to state law, 
in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate 
to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law? 
Id. at 78 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 
4. See California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, in which Justice White stated that 
"the ultimate issue is whether Congress intended to create a private right of action." Id. 
at 293. See also Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 23-24 (1979) 
(White, J., dissenting); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979). 
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plied private rights of action.5 This pattern clearly is discernible 
from the recent decision in California v. Sierra Club, 6 in which a 
private right of action was not implied on behalf of those allegedly 
injured by a claimed violation of Section 10 of the Rivers and 
Harbors Act of 1899 (the Act).7 
This note will summarize briefly the history of implied rights of 
action. The more recent post-Cort cases that evidence the trend 
away from implied rights of action then will be examined. Sierra 
Club, the culmination of this trend, then will be analyzed. A further 
avenue also will be pursued: Whether recent decisions of the Court 
provide a potential option for plaintiffs alleging federal statutory vi­
olations, rather than having plaintiffs rely on an implied private right 
of action. Specifically, the note will discuss whether 42 U.S.c. sec­
tion 19838 may be used as express authority as a remedial statute to 
provide a right of action to pursue alleged federal statutory viola­
tions. This express provision would provide an alternative access to 
the courts rather than forcing plaintiffs to rely on private rights of 
action implied directly from the statutes.9 
II. SIERRA CLUB: BACKGROUND 
In 1971, two environmental groups, the Sierra Club and Friends 
of the Earth, together with two private individuals, brought an action 
to enjoin the allegedly unlawful construction and operation of three 
5. Including the note case, six of the last eight cases in which the issue of whether 
private rights of action may be implied from a given statute have resulted in the denial of 
that implication. See notes 69-77 infra and accompanying text. 
6. 451 U.S. 287 (1981). 
7. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1976). 
8. 42 U.S.c. § 1983 (1976) provides: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or 
usage, of any State or T ..:rritory or the District of Columbia; subjects, or causes 
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation ofany rights, privileges, or immunities se­
cured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 
action at law, suit in equity, or othl!r proper proceeding for redress. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
9. Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivation of "any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws ...." Id. The practice of implying a 
remedy directly from the Constitution began with Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 
Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (fourth amendment violations); see also Carlson v. Green, 
446 U.S. 14 (1980) (implying a remedy from the eighth amendment). An illustration of 
the Court's present posture is Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Car/son, to the effect that it is 
beyond the constitutional power of the Court to imply a private civil damage remedy 
from any constitutional provision. Id. at 34 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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major facilities at the California Water Project. IO The California 
Water Project consisted of both state and federal facilities. lI It was 
constructed, in part, as a response to California's need to distribute 
water from areas of abundant supply to areas deficient in water sup­
ply.12 To this end, water from winter runoff is stored behind dams in 
the Sacramento River and then released, as needed, to flow 
downriver into the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta (Delta), where it 
merges with other Delta waters. From the Delta, the water is 
pumped to more arid regions of central, coastal, and southern Cali­
fornia. \3 The pumping capacity of the Delta Pumping Plant is ap­
proximately 6,300 cubic feet per second. 14 This capacity could be 
increased by the installation of additional pumping units. When Si­
erra Club was initiated, the first of these additional pumps was ex­
10. Sierra Club v. Morton, 400 F. Supp. 610 (N.D. Cal. 1975), ajf'd in part, rev'd in 
part sub nom., Sierra Club v. Andrus, 610 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1979), rev'd on other grounds 
sub nom., California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981). The Sierra Club is a nonprofit 
California corporation. Its express purposes include "the preservation and conservation 
of the natural resources, fish, and wildlife of the United States, including its rivers, bays, 
wetlands, deltas, and estuarine areas." ld. at 619. Plaintiff organization, Friends of the 
Earth, is a nonprofit New York corporation. Its purposes include the preservation and 
rational use of the environment. ld. 
The private individuals joined as plaintiffs were Hank Schramm and William 
Dixon. Schramm fishes commercially in the San Francisco Bay area and the Pacific 
Ocean. Dixon's interest in the suit was founded on his part ownership of a duck club 
whose existence depended in large part on sufficient, non-polluted supplies of water. 
Thus, both Schramm and Dixon provided economic interests that were being injured by 
the maintenance of the facilities. ld. 
II. The federal component is designated the Central Valley Project and comes 
under the auspices of the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. The state component, the State 
Water Project, is administered by the Department of Water Resources which is a depart­
ment within the Resources Agency of California. The State Water Project was created 
by the Burns-Porter Act of 1959 and now codified in CAL. WATER CODE §§ 12930-12942 
(West 1971). Sierra Club v. Morton, 400 F. Supp. 610, 618 (N.D. Cal. 1975), ajf'd in part, 
rev'd in part sub nom., Sierra Club v. Andrus, 610 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1979), rev'd on other 
groun{is sub nom., California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981). 
12. Specifically, this project carries water from the relatively moist climate of 
northern California, to the more arid central and southern portions of the state. Sierra 
Club v. Morton, 400 F. Supp. 610, 618 (N.D. Cal. 1975), ajf'd in part, rev'd in part sub 
nom., Sierra Club v. Andrus, 610 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1979), rev'd on other grounds sub 
nom., California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981). 
13. The federal and state pumping plants are integral elements of the California 
Water Project. The Tracy Pumping Plant, the principal component ofthe federal arm of 
the water project, pumps water from the Delta into the Delta-Mendota Canal, a 115-mile 
canal leading to the Mendota pool in the Central Valley. The state pumping plant, 
known as the Delta Pumping Plant, along with the Tracy Pumping Plant, withdraws 
water from the Delta and pumps it into a canal, where the water is ultimately permitted 
to flow to its place of use. ld. at 618-21. 
14. Stated otherwise, the capacity existed to pump 12,600 acre-feet of water per 
day. ld. at 621. 
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pected to be operational in 1980.15 The district court found that the 
pumping already being accomplished, combined with the proposed 
increases in pumping capacity, would create serious effects on the 
Delta water level. I6 Thus, the backdrop of this action was the al­
leged harmful effects, not only of the existing operation of the pump­
ing plants but also of the proposed increase in plant facilities and 
pumping capacities, on the water level of the Delta and surrounding 
areas. 17 
The pumping had a significant, deleterious effect upon the water 
levels of the Delta. The district court found: 
[E]xport pumping by these facilities [Tracy and Delta Pumping 
Plants] both lowered Delta water levels and at certain times 
caused net flow reversals in Delta waterways. Although it is true 
that the exact magnitude of these effects was not precisely estab­
lished, it is clear that they are far from any sort of de minimis 
exception. IS 
Plaintiffs moved to enjoin the operation and construction of spe­
cific facilities of the California Water Project. 19 The action was 
based on alleged statutory violations of the Act.20 The purpose of 
the injunction was to force the California Water Project to comply 
15. Several studies were considered by the district court on the effect of the pump­
ing on Delta water levels. A 1968 study concluded that Delta water levels near the inlet 
channel of the pumping plant were lowered .1 feet per 1000 cubic feet per second 
pumped. The effects of the pumping were detectable as'far away as the San Joaquin and 
Sacramento Rivers. Another study measured the combined effects of the Tracy and 
Delta Plants. The study concluded that diversion of between 9,600 and 12,000 cubic feet 
per second during both high high and low high tides resulted in a lowered water level of 
1.0 to 1.5 feet at one location near the pumping plants and almost .1 foot at a location of . 
the San Joaquin River. Id. at 631. 
16. See note 15 supra. The district court found that the figures from studies done 
in this area, represented the minimum effect of the pumping plants on Delta water levels, 
and that it was "highly probable if not certain" that an increase in the amount of pump­
ing capacity would result in greater effects. Sierra Club v. Morton, 400 F. Supp. 610, 631 
(N.D. Cal. 1975), ajJ'd in parI, rev'd in part sub nom., Sierra Club v. Andrus, 610 F.2d 581 
(9th Cir. 1979), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 
(1981). 
17. In 1973, the Delta Pumping Plant withdrew 1,126,120 acre-feet of water from 
the Delta. The State of California has already entered into contracts providing that at 
some future time the State Water Project will deliver annually 4,230,000 acre-feet of 
water, of which 99% will be pumped by the Delta Pumping Plant. With additional 
pumping units and proposed canals, the potential withdrawal of Delta water by both the 
Tracy and Delta Pumping Plants will increase to approximately 7,000,000 acre-feet in 
1980, and approximately 7,750,000 acre-feet by 2020. Id, at 619. 
18. Id. at 632. 
19. Id. 
20. 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-418 (1976). 
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with the permit requirements contained within the ACt.21 The dis­
trict court held in favor of plaintiffs and ordered federal and state 
defendants to obtain authorization for the operation of their pump­
ing plants from the United States Army Corps of Engineers. Such 
authorization was required pursuant to section 10 of the Act.22 The 
court further held that the Secretary of the Army must prepare an 
environmental impact statement prior to issuing the authorization.23 
Thus, the merits of the claim were based on whether the court could 
determine that the impact of the pumping on the Delta water levels 
fell within the regulatory jurisdiction of the Army Corps of Engi­
neers.24 Before the district court could reach the merits, however, it 
first had to determine whether plaintiffs, as private individuals, could 
judicially enforce the permit requirements of section 10 of the Act. 25 
21. The permit requirements are found specifically in section 10 of the Rivers and 
Harbors Act of 1899 which provides: 
The creation of any obstruction not affirmatively authorized by Congress, to the 
navigable capacity of any of the waters of the United States is prohibited; alld it 
shall not be lawful to build or commence the building of any wharf, pier, 
dolphin, boom, weir, breakwater, bulkhead, jetty, or other structures in any 
port, roadstead, haven, harbor, canal, navigable river, or other water of the 
United States, outside established harbor lines, or where no harbor lines have 
been established, except on plans recommended by the Chief of Engineers and 
authorized by the Secretary of the Army; and it shall not be lawful to excavate 
or fill, or in any manner to alter or modify the court, location, condition, or 
capacity of, any port, roadstead, haven, harbor, canal, lake, harbor or refuse, or 
inclosure within the limits of any breakwater, or of the channel of any naviga­
ble water of the United States, unless the work has been recommended by the 
Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of the Army prior to begin­
ning the same. 
Id. § 403. 
22. Sierra Club v. Morton, 400 F. Supp. 610, 644 (N.D. Cal. 1975), ajf'd in part, 
rev'd in part sub nom., Sierra Club v. Andrus, 610 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1979), rev'd on other 
grounds sub nom., California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981). 
23. Id. at 644-45. 
24. Id. at 632. 
25. The district court observed that those courts of appeals that had considered the 
issue had inconsistent holdings. Id. at 622. See Red Star Towing and Transp. Co. v. 
Department of Transp., 423 F.2d 104, 106 (3d Cir. 1970) (governmental enforcement is 
exclusive and Congress did not create any civil cause of action in favor of private parties 
injured by any violation of the Act); Bass Anglers Sportsman's Soc'y v. Scholze Tannery, 
Inc., 329 F. Supp. 339, 348-49 (E.D. Tenn. 1971); Guthrie v. Alabama By-Products Co., 
328 F. Supp. 1140, 1148 (N.D. Ala. 1971), ajf'd., 456 F.2d 1294 (5th Cir. 1972) (although 
section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act may create a federally protected right against 
deposit of refuse that injures navigation or anchorage, the injury of other private rights, 
even from deposits in violation ofsection 13, does not give rise to a federal right of action 
nor does it supply a basis for federal jurisdiction); Bass Angler Sportsman Soc'y v. 
United States Steel Corp., 324 F. Supp. 412, 416 (N.D. Ala.) ajf'd sub nom., Bass Anglers 
Sportsman Soc'y v. Koppers Co., 447 F.2d 1034 (5th Cir. 1971) (no private right of action 
exists under section I3 to redress public injuries). Contra Alameda Conservation Ass'n v. 
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The only express statutory grant of authority to enjoin viola­
tions of the Act app~ars in section 12.26 Section 12 of the Act in­
cludes a general and unqualified grant of jurisdiction to the district 
courts to enjoin violations of section 10 of the ACt.27 Although the 
Act expressly confers jurisdiction on the district courts to enjoin all 
violations of the Act and also permits the United States Attorney 
General to seek such relief on behalf of the federal government, it 
neither affirms nor denies the right of private parties to enforce the 
equitable remedies that it authorizes the courts to grant.28 Due to 
this statutory ambiguity, the threshold question for the district court 
was to determine whether a private right of action could be implied 
from the statutory language.29 The district court correctly prefaced 
the issue by noting: 
Private rights of action are based on a public policy of allowing 
injured parties to obtain civil redress for injuries resulting from 
the violation of statutorily imposed duties where the maintenance 
of such actions would effectuate the purposes intended to be 
served by the Act and would not interfere with the operation of 
the statutory scheme. 30 
In determining that this threshold inquiry would be answered in 
the affirmative, the district court relied not only on precedent, which 
at best was ambiguous,31 but also on a positive satisfaction of an 
elemental test designed specifically for this kind of inquiry.32 In 
California, 437 F.2d 1087, 1094-95 (9th Cir. 1971) (implies that a private right of action 
exists under sections 9 and 10 of the Act); Neches Canal Co. v. Miller & Vidor Lumber 
Co., 24 F.2d 763, 765 (5th Cir. 1928) (private right of action exists to redress specific 
injuries). In Alameda Conservation Assn, the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief alleging 
injury under sections 9 and 10. The court ruled that all of the individual plaintiffs had 
standing to sue and reversed the district court's dismissal. Alameda Conservation Ass'n, 
437 F.2d at 1095. Before a court can rule on standing, there must be a ruling that a right 
·of action exists. Thus, sub silentio, the Ninth Circuit implied a private right of action 
under sections 9 and 10 of the Act. 
26. [T]he removal of any structures or parts of structures erected in viola­
tion of the provisions of the said sections may be enforced by the injunction of 
any district court exercising jurisdiction in any district in which such structures 
may exist, and proper proceedings to this end may be instituted under the direc­
tion of the Attorney General ofthe United States. 
33 U.S.C. § 406 (1976). 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. Sierra Club v. Morton, 400 F. Supp. 610, 622 (N.D. Cal. 1975), affd in part, 
rev'd in part sub nom., Sierra Club v. Andrus, 610 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1979), rev'd on other 
grounds sub nom., California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981). 
30. Id. at 622. 
31. Id. See note 25 supra and accompanying text. 
32. See note 33 infra and accompanying text. 
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Corf, the Supreme Court delineated the relevant four-part inquiry to 
determine whether a private right of action is implicit in a statute not 
expressly providing one.33 In analyzing the pertinent provisions of 
the Act in light of the four-part Corf test,34 the Sierra Club district 
court concluded that a private right of action could be implied to 
exist under sections 9 and 10 of the Act.35 The United States Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed this part of the decision.36 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the water agencies and the 
State of California.37 In a unanimous judgment,38 the Supreme 
Court reversed the lower courts and held that no private right of 
action could be implied on behalf of those allegedly injured by a 
claimed violation of the Act.39 
III. IMPLIED RIGHTS OF ACTION AND THE ACT 
In holding that no private right of action could be implied 
under the Act, the Court made two definitive statements: one spe­
cific, the other, general. The former defined the nature and scope of 
33. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). In Cort, an action was brought by a stockholder seeking an 
injunction and a derivative claim for damages, based on an alleged violation of the Fed­
eral Election Campaign Act, 18 U.S.c. § 610 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The Supreme 
Court, in an opinion by Justice Brennan, held, inter alia, that a private cause of action 
was not available with regard to alleged violations under the statute. 422 U.S. at 78. The 
Court further provided a four-part inquiry to aid in determining whether to recognize a 
private right of action impliedly from a statute not expressly providing one: (1) is the 
plaintiff one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted; (2) is there 
any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or 
deny one; (3) is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to 
imply such a remedy for the plaintiff; and (4) is the cause of action one traditionally 
relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the states, so that it would be 
inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law? Id. 
34. See note 75 infra and accompanying text. 
35. Sierra Club v. Morton, 400 F. Supp. 610, 623 (N.D. Cal. .1975), ajJ'd in part, 
rev'd in part sub nom., Sierra Club v. Andrus, 610 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1979), rev'd on other 
grounds sub nom., California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981). 
36. Sierra Club v. Andrus, 610 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1979), rev'd on other grounds sub 
nom. , California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981). The Ninth Circuit reversed a part 
of the district court decision that went to the merits of the statutory violation. For the 
purpose of this note, it is unnecessary to qualify the appellate decision any further than 
citing the court's affirmation of the implied private right of action under sections 9 and 10 
of the Act. Id. at 592. 
37. 449 U.S. 818 (1980). 
38. Justice Stevens filed a concurring opinion. 451 U.S. at 298. Justice Rehnquist 
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment which was joined by Chief Justice Burger 
and Justices Stewart and Powell. Id. at 301. 
39. Id. at 287 (1981). The Court, in holding that no private cause of action could 
be implied, precluded any need to reach the merits of the claim. Id. at 298. 
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rights of action under the pertinent sections of the Act.40 The latter 
reaffirmed the recently manifested trend away from implying private 
rights of action for federal statutory violations.41 
Sections 9 and 10 of the Act reflect the late nineteenth century 
view of the federal commerce power. The broad assertion of federal 
power and ambiguous delegation of administrative power both have 
roots in the acts, cases, and theories of commerce and navigation 
prior to 1899.42 In the common law of the last century, it was well 
settled that any obstruction of a navigable stream, if undertaken 
without specific legal authorization, was a public nuisance. This nui­
sance could be enjoined by suit of any private party to whom it had 
caused particular injury.43 In Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont 
Bridge Co. ,44 the Supreme Court held that a common-law action for 
nuisance could result in court ordered abatement of a structure ob­
structing navigable waters, either by removal or alteration.45 Later 
courts, however, did not follow the lead suggested in Wheeling. 
When the United States or private citizens sought to remove state 
40. For a specific reference to the scope of the provisions of the Rivers and 
Harbors Act of 1899 and how they should be applied, see United States v. Republic Steel 
Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960), advancing a broad definition ofthe scope of the Act. Specifi­
cally U[w]e read the 1899 Act charitably in light of the purpose to be served. The philoso­
phy of the statement of Mr. Justice Holmes ... that 'A river is more than an amenity, it 
is a treasure,'/orbids a narrow cramped reading either of section 13 or of section 10." 362 
U.S. at 491 (quoting New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342 (1931) (emphasis 
added». 
41. See Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77 (1981); Uni­
versities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754 (1981). These were the two cases which 
dealt with the issue just prior to Sierra Club, and in both, the Court denied a request to 
imply a private right of action. See also Middlesex City Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea 
Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. I (1981); Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, 451 U.S. 630 
(1981). These cases are the post-Sierra Club cases in which the issue was adjudicated and 
in both, no implied private right of action was determined to exist. 
42. In Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I (1824) control over navigation was 
placed squarely within Congress' commerce power. This broad assertion was qualified in 
Wilson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 250 (1829) in which the 
Court held that a legitimate local health concern could justify a state's regulation of 
commerce. Wilson represented the first Supreme Court case concerning an obstruction 
to navigable waters. 
43. See, e.g., Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. 713, 722-24 (1866); Pennsylvania v. 
Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. 518, 563 (1851); Mayor of Georgetown v. Alex­
andria Canal Co., 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 91, 97-99 (1838); Woodruff v. North Bloomfield 
Gravel Mining Co., 18 F. Cas. 753, 769-71 (C.C. Cal. 1844); Works v. The Junction R.R., 
30 F. Cas. 626, 627 (C.C. Ohio 1853); Lansing v. Smith, 4 Wend. 9, 25 (N.Y. 1829); 
Hughes v. Heiser, I Binn. 463, 465 (Pa. 1808). See generally F. POLLOCK, LAW OF TORTS 
488-90 (Amer. ed. 1894); Smith, Private Action/or Obstruction to Public Right ofPassage, 
15 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1915). 
44. 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518 (1851). 
45. Id. at 564. 
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approved structures, the courts consistently ruled that in the absence 
of a federal law prohibiting obstructions to navigable waters, no 
remedy could be granted.46 The tenor of the situation was best 
stated by the Supreme Court in Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. 
Hatch:47 
The power of Congress to pass laws for the regulation of the navi­
gation of public rivers, and to prevent any and all obstructions 
therein, is not questioned. But until it does pass some such law, 
there is no common law of the United States which prohibits ob­
structions and nuisances in navigable rivers. . . . There must be 
a direct statute of the United States in order to bring within the 
scope of its laws, as administered by the CQurts of law and equity, 
obstructions and nuisances in navigable streams within the 
State.48 
In response to Willamette Iron Bridge, the Rivers and Harbors 
Act of 189()49 was passed. 50 The statute stated that "[t]he creation of 
any obstruction, not affirmatively authorized by law, to the naviga­
ble capacity of any waters, in respect of which the United States has 
jurisdiction, is hereby prohibited."51 The statute ended a piecemeal 
approach to federal regulation of obstructions to navigable waters 
and set the framework for the enactment of sections 9 and I 0 to the 
Act nine years later. 52 
In Sierra Club, the district court believed that the congressional 
46. See Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U.S. 1 (1888); Cardwell v. Amer­
ican Bridge Co., 133 U.S. 205, 208 (1885) (in the absence of congressional action to the 
contrary, a bridge obstructing the American River in California was held to be properly 
authorized by the state legislature); Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U.S. 678, 687 (1882) 
. (in light of no congressional action, an ordinance requiring the closing of draw bridges 
during rush hour was held not to be an obstruction in navigation); Pound v. Turck, 95 
U.S. 459, 462-64 (1877) (in the absence of conflicting congressional action, a dam author­
ization by the state, is not an obstruction to navigation); Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. 
(3 Wall.) 713 (1865) (absent contrary congressional action, a bridge spanning the 
Schuykill River is not an impediment to navigation); United States v. Beef Slough Mfg., 
Booming, Log Driving & Transp. Co., 24 F. Cas. 1064 (C.C.W.D. Wis. 1879) (in the 
absence ofenabling legislation by Congress, the United States is unable to remove booms 
blocking the Chippewa River). 
47. 125 U.S. 1 (1888). 
48. Id. at 8. 
49. Ch. 907, 26 Stat. 426 (1890). . 
50. The sponsor of the 1890 Act was U.S. Senator 1.M. Dolph, who was counsel for 
the party opposing the construction of the bridge in Wil/amelle Iron Bridge Co. 
51. Ch. 907, § 10, 26 Stat. 426. 
52. For a discussion of the substantive legislative framework preceding the codifi­
cation of existing laws manifested in the ultimate passage of the River and Harbors Act 
of 1899, see Comment, Sections 9 and 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899: The 
Erosion ofAdministrative Control by Environmental Suits, 1980 DUKE L.1. 170, 176-81. 
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response to WI/lamette Iron Bridge was clear evidence that the Act 
was enacted not only to allow the United States regulatory control 
over obstructions to navigable waters, but also to prevent private in­
juries by obstructions not authorized by the United States. 53 The 
Supreme Court, however, did not share the view that clear legislative 
intent was present. The Court instead reviewed the issue of implica­
tion of a private right of action in light of its own tests for judicially 
discerning congressional intent. 54 
IV. IMPLIED RIGHTS OF ACTION 
The doctrine of implied rights of action has been traced to an 
1854 English case in which the court used the doctrine to effectuate 
the overall goals of a statute. 55 This justification arguably places the 
courts in the best position to ensure the effectiveness of remedial leg­
islation.56 The United States Supreme Court case generally regarded 
as originating the federal doctrine of implied rights of action is Texas 
& Pacific Railway v. Rigsby.57 The Court held that an injured rail­
road worker had an implied right of action to sue his employer for 
damages under the Federal Safety Appliance Act.58 
In the fifty years since Rigsby, courts have found implied rights 
of action in a number of federal statutes.59 In J.l. Case Co. v. 
53. Sierra Club v. Morton, 400 F. Supp. 610,623, n.8 (N.D. Cal. 1975), ajf'd in part, 
rev'd in part sub nom., Sierra Club v. Andrus, 610 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1979), rev'd on other 
grounds sub nom., California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981). 
54. 451 U.S. at 292-93. See notes 98-120 infra and accompanying text. 
55. Couch v. Steel, 118 Eng. Rep. 1193 (Q.B. 1854). See Loss, The SEC Proxy 
Rules in the Courts, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1041, 1045 (1960); Thayer, Public Wrong and 
Private Action, 27 HARV. L. REV. 317 (1914). The doctrine of implied rights of action 
was traditionally based upon tort theories of inferring negligence from breach of statu­
tory standards of conduct. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 190-92 
(4th ed. 1971); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965). 
56. See Note, Emerging Standards For Implied Remedies Under Federal Statutes, 9 
U. MICH. J.L. REF. 294, 296 (1976). 
57. 241 U.S. 33 (1916). 
58. 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-7, 11-15 (1976). Speaking specifically of section 4 of the Safety 
and Appliance Act of 1910, the Court stated that where a violation of a statutory com­
mand has resulted in damage or injury to one "for whose especial benefit the statute was 
enacted", the right to recover damages will be implied. 241 U.S. at 39-40. The Court 
based the principle on a common law doctrine: 
So, therefore, in every case where a statute enacts, or prohibits a thing for the 
benefit of a person, he shall have a remedy upon the same statute for the thing 
enacted for his advantage, or for the recompense of a wrong done to him con­
trary to the said law. 
Id. at 39 (citation ·omitted). 
59. See, e.g., Euresti v. Stenner, 458 F.2d 1115 (10th Cir. 1972) (Hill-Burton Act, 
42 U.S.C. § 291 (1976»; Like v. Carter, 448 F.2d 798 (8th Cir. 1971) (Social Security Act, 
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Borak60 and Wyandotte Transportation Co. v. United States,61 the 
Supreme Court compiled a liberal set of standards for finding im­
plied rights of action. Within the broad framework of these stan­
dards, the inquiry focused on whether the existing liability 
provisions were adequate to effectuate the congressional purpose. In 
Borak, the Court emphasized the Securities Exchange Act's (SEA)62 
broad remedial purposes,63 finding private enforcement to be "neces­
sary to make effective the congressional purpose."64 In Wyandotte, 
the Court clarified the essential factors to determine whether to im­
ply a private right of action: (1) Whether the interests of plaintiff 
were within the class protected by the statute; (2) whether the harm 
that occurred was of the kind that the statute was intended to pre­
vent; and (3) whether criminal liability was adequate to ensure the 
effective enforcement of the statute.65 
Since 1975, however, the Supreme Court has indicated a retreat 
from the liberal attitude of the Borak- Wyandotte era.66 In National 
Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Association ofRatlroad Passen­
gers (Amtrak) ,67 the Court would not recognize a private right of 
action under the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 (the Amtrak 
42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1396(g) (1976», cerl. denied, 405 U.S. 1045 (1972); Gomez v. Florida 
State Employment Serv., 417 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1969) (Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933, 29 
U.S.c. § 49 (1976»; Fitzgerald v. Pan Am. World Airways, 229 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1956) 
(section 1374(6) Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 484(b), 622(a), 676 (1976»; Guernsey 
v. Rich Plan, 408 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ind. 1976) (Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 41-77 (1976»; Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 
1946) (section lOb of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.c. § 78j(b) (1976». 
60. 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (implied right of action found under section l4(a) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976». 
61. 389 U.S. 191 (1967) (Court held criminal sanction of section 15 of the Rivers 
and Harbors Act of 1899,33 U.S.C. § 409 (1976), was not the exclusive remedy under the 
statute, and that the United States could bring a civil action to recover the costs of re­
moving a vessel obstructing navigable waters from the owner). 
62. 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1976). 
63. See note 60 supra. 
64. 377 U.S. at 433. 
65. 389 U.S. at 202. 
66. In the decade of the Borak- Wyandotte decisions, four other cases arose in 
which the implied right of action issue was specifically adjudicated, and in all four, a 
cause of action was found. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 
6 (1971) (implying a cause of action for violation of section IOb-5 of the Securities Ex­
change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976»; Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 
U.S. 229 (1969) (damage remedy for housing discrimination permitted under 42 U.S.c. 
§ 1982 (1976»; Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) (identifying a private 
right of action to enforce the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.c. §§ 1973-1973p (1970»; 
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (injunctive relief granted under 42 
U.S.C. § 1982 (1976». 
67. 414 U.S. 453 (1974). 
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Act).68 In deciding whether to imply a private right of action, the 
Amtrak Court looked beyond both the harm the Amtrak Act was 
intended to prevent and the adequacy of existing remedies. The 
Court stressed the necessity of determining whether Congress specifi­
cally intended to grant a private right of action to plaintiffs in those 
particular circumstances.69 As a means of ascertaining congressional 
intent, the Court invoked the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio 
. alterius 70 and interpreted a section of the Amtrak Act providing for 
enforcement by the Attorney General as a signal that Congress in­
tended to preclude all other remedies.7l 
This restrictive approach has continued in subsequent deci­
sions.72 The Court consistently has ignored the question of whether 
an injured plaintiff has an adequate remedy under a statute. The 
focus, instead, has been to determine congressional intent at the time 
of enactment.73 
This concern for congressional intent became central to the 
Supreme Court's first comprehensive implication test, expounded in 
Cort v. Ash.74 In Cort, four factors were considered in order to de­
68. 45 U.S.c. §§ 501-650 (1976). 
69. 414 U.S. at 458. 
70. The expression of one thing is the exclusion of another. 
71. 414 U.S. at 461, 464. The Court held that Congress would not have replaced 
the delays inherent in administrative proceedings with even greater delays inherent in 
federal court proceedings. ld. at 464. 
72. See, e.g., Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77 (1981) 
(no implied right of action for contribution under Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.c. § 206(d) 
(1963) and Titre VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976 & Supp. 
III 1979) and no federal common law right to contribution from unions that allegedly 
bear at least partial responsibility for such statutory violations); University Research 
Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754 (1981) (Court held that no private right of action exists 
under the Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.c. §§ 276a to 276a-5 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) for an 
employee seeking back wages under a contract that administratively has been deter­
mined not to call for Davis-Bacon work); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. 
Lewis, 444 U.S. II (1979) (expressio unius invoked to deny implied private action under 
section 206 of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.c. § 80b-6 (1976»; Touche 
Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) (no implied private action under section 
17(a) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.c. § 78q(a) (1976»; Cort v. Ash, 422 
U.S. 66 (1975) (no implied private action under Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 
18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970) (repealed 1976»; Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 
421 U.S. 412 (1975) (Court reluctant to imply private action as section 7(b) of Securities 
Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 79(b) (1976), provided an administrative 
remedy). 
73. Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77 (1981), in which 
the Court stated that unless congressional intent can be inferred from the statutory lan­
guage, the statutory structure, or some other source, there is no predicate for finding an 
implied right of action. ld. at 94. 
74. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). 
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termine the existence of a private right of action. 
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial bene­
fit the statute was enacted," . . . that is, does the statute create a 
federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indica­
tion of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a 
remedy or to deny one? . . Third, is it consistent with the under­
lying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy 
for plaintiffs? . . And finally, is the cause of action one tradition­
ally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the 
States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action 
based solely on federal law?75 
The four Cort factors are listed in the conjunctive, not the dis­
junctive. Thus, a finding that Congress intended to deny a private 
cause of action disposes of the implication issue.76 In the decisions 
that have followed Cort, the Supreme Court has relied on discerning 
the legislative intent as manifested in the statutory language and in 
the statute's legislative history.77 These decisions indicate that the 
Court no longer considers the Cort analysis sufficiently restrictive. 
In several decisions prior to Sierra Club, the Court has turned to its 
more restrictive Amtrak approach.78 
An illustration of the nonuniform, pragmatic approach em­
ployed by the Court concerning implied rights of action can be seen 
by comparing and contrasting three recent cases. In Touche Ross & 
Co. v. Redington,19 the Court held that section 17(a) of the SEA re­
quiring broker-dealers and others to keep records and file reports 
prescribed by the Securities and Exchange Commission, does not 
75. ld. at 78 (citations omitted). See note 2 supra and accompanying text. The 
Court qualified the situations where an implied private right of action had been found by 
distinguishing the cases on two grounds: (I) Where there is a clearly articulated federal 
right in the plaintiff, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (im­
plied remedy found directly from fourth amendment of the Constitution); and (2) where 
there is a pervasive legislative scheme governing the relationship between the plaintiff 
class and the defendant class in a particular regard. See 1.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 
426 (1974); see also Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) (implying a cause of action 
and a damage remedy directly from the fifth amendment for a sex discrimination suit). 
76. 422 U.S. at 82-83. 
77. See notes 65-75 supra and accompanying text. 
78. Eg., Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77 (1981) (eq­
uitable claims should be addressed to Congress not the courts when interpreting a statute 
where a private remedy is not provided); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 
444 U.S. II (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); Cannon v. 
University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 749 (1979) (Powell, 1., dissenting) (Cor( test permits 
implication too readily; courts should not condone implication "absent the most compel­
ling evidence that Congress in fact mtended such an action to exist"). 
79. 442 U.S. 560 (1979). 
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create a private right of action. The principal basis for the Court's 
holding was the absence of any language in section 17(a) to indicate 
that Congress intended to create private rights of action.80 The 
Court also justified its holding by examining section 17(a) within the 
general statutory framework of the securities laws. Noting that sec­
tion 17(a) is flanked by provisions of the SEA that expressly grant 
private causes of action,81 the Court found, via expressio unius, that 
the existence of these express remedies militated against 
implication.82 
Notwithstanding the tenor of the reasoning displayed in Touche 
Ross, the Court in Cannon v. University ofChicago,83 implied a right 
of action under section 90l(a) of title IX to the Education Amend­
ments of 1972.84 The Cannon Court utilized a straight Cort analysis 
to imply the cause of action under title IX.85 Further, in dismissing 
the expressio unius argument against implying a cause of action, the 
Court held that the presence of express remedies in other provisions 
of a complex statutory scheme is an insufficient reason, by itself, for 
refusing to imply an otherwise appropriate remedy under a separate 
section.86 In footnotes, the Cannon Court attempted to structure the 
recent history of implied rights of action by advancing a theory of 
complete dependency on statutory language.87 Under this analysis, 
statutes that were phrased in terms of the persons benefited have 
been held to imply a private right of action.88 In comparison, stat­
utes that create duties on the part of persons for the benefit of the 
public at large, generally have been held not to confer implied pri­
vate rights of action. Typically, these are criminal statutes.89 Even 
80. Id. at 568-69. 
81. Securities and Exchange Act, ch. 404, §§ 16(b), 18(a), 9(e), 48 Stat. 881 (current 
version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78p(b), 78r(a), 781(e) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980». 
82. 442 U.S. at 571-72. The Court invoked the reasoning it used in Blue Chip 
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 734 (1975). ''When Congress wished to 
provide a damage remedy, it knew how to do so and did so expressly". Id. at 734. 
83. 441 U.S. 677(1979). 
84. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1976). 
85. 441 U.S. at 689-90. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 690 n.l3. 
88. E.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life and Cas., 404 U.S. 6 (1971); Sulli­
van v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 
U.S. 544 (1969); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); Wyandotte Transp. 
Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). 
See 441 U.S. at 690 n.l3. 
89. E.g., Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 
(1975); Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975); National 
R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National R.R. Passengers Ass'n (Amtrak), 414 U.S. 453 (1974); 
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under the historical perspective enunciated in Cannon, the Court has 
recognized deviations from this pattem.90 
This nonuniformity and Civentual inconsistency is illustrated 
further by Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis.91 In Trans­
america, the Court never mentioned the Cort test; while in Touche 
Ross, the majority held that the four Cort factors did not necessarily 
hold equal weight.92 Thus, if congressional intent is the central in­
quiry, the first three inquiries of the Cort test become the backbone 
relied upon in the general determination of legislative intent.93 This 
weighting of the Cort factors was part of the parallel reasoning put 
forth by Justice Brennan in his concurring opinion to Touche Ross. 
There, he stated that satisfaction of two oflthe Cort factors could not 
be a basis for implying a right of action when the two remaining 
factors remain unsatisfied.94 
The effect of this malleability of the Cort test has been to allow 
legislative intent to subsume the other factors.95 This scenario was 
crystallized in Northwest Airlines v. Transport Worker's Union,96 de­
cided just prior to Sierra Club, in which the issue was before the 
Court. In Northwest Airlines, the Court advanced the notion that 
unless congressional intent for implying a right of action can be in­
ferred, there will be no predicate for invoking the doctrine. Further, 
the judiciary may not fashion new remedies that might upset care­
fully considered legislative programs.97 
V. ANALYSIS 
A. Restriction Continued 
It was in this restrictive mood that the Supreme Court heard the 
appeal ofSierra Club. The liberal tenets of the Borak- Wyandolle era 
had been displaced by recent decisions restricting the scope of the 
doctrine of implied rights of action, albeit in a pragmatic, 
Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963); Time v. United States, 359 U.S. 464 (1959); 
Montana-Dakota Uill,. v. Northwest Pub. Serv., 341 U.S. 246 (1951). See 441 U.S. at 698 
n.23. 
90. See, e.g., Machinists v. Central Airlines, 372 U.S. 682 (1962) (implied cause of 
action found under Railway Labor Act which created a duty on the part of common 
carriers to establish boards of adjustment). 
91. 444 U.S. II (1979). 
92. 442 U.S. at 575-76. 
93. See note 33 supra. 
94. 442 U.S. at 579-80 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
95. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979). 
96. 451 U.S. 77 (1981). 
97. Id. at 94-95. 
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nonuniform manner.98 
The Sierra Club Court proceeded through a sequential analysis 
of the Cort factors, prefacing its procedure with the statement that 
Cort provided a "preferred approach" for making the threshold de­
termination of whether a private right of action should be implied.99 
The Court, however, made it clear that the analysis was aimed at 
deciding whether Congress intended to create a private right of ac­
tion under section 10 of the Act.l00 
Justice White's opinion 101 under the Cort analysis, first deter­
mined that plaintiffs were not members of the specific class for 
whose especial benefit the Act had been promulgated. 102 Justice 
White reasoned that the Act was designed to benefit the public at 
large and thus created no specific class of especial beneficiaries of the 
Act's proscriptions. The Court. added that plaintiffs were not espe­
cial beneficiaries merely because they were specially harmed by the 
alleged statutory violation. Under this reasoning, the Court believed 
that any victim of any crime would be deemed an especial benefici­
ary of the criminal statute's proscription.103 This logic, however, is 
circular and requires a more detailed framework to determine espe­
cial beneficiaries. Under this reasoning, the public at large would be 
considered beneficiaries of a statute's proscriptions. Yet the specific 
victim of the violation could never alter his status from a mere bene­
ficiary to that of an especial beneficiary. The Court thus precluded 
those privately and uniquely damaged by a statutory violation from 
having any federal rights under the statute. It is arguable that the 
Court claimed to protect everyone, yet did not allow those specifi­
cally damaged by a violation to assert that very protection which is 
provided by the statute. 
By defining the word especial in terms of what it is not, in order 
to avoid mooting the term,I04 the Court constructively made it im­
98. See notes 58-66 supra and accompanying text. 
99. 451 U.S. at 292 (1981) (quoting Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. 
Lewis, 444 U.S. ll, 26 (1979». 
100. 451 U.S. at 294. 
101. Justice White was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Ste­
vens. Justice Stevens also wrote a separate concurrence. Justice Rehnquist, joined by 
Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Stewart and Powell, concurred in the judgment. 
102. 451 U.S. at 293. See a/so note 3 supra and accompanying text (determination 
of membership in an especial class is the first inquiry under Cor/). 
103. 451 U.S. at 293-94. See a/so Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. at 686 
n.7 (1979). 
104. The Court states that if the term 'especial' were allowed to apply to any per­
son 'especially harmed' by a statutory violation, the term would become "meaningless." 
451 U.S. at 294. / 
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possible for any private plaintiff, except the United States, to achieve 
especial status. 105 This negative definitional procedure was deemed 
necessary in order to avoid broadening the term especial to a point 
where it would lose any specific application and thus become ineffec­
tive as a limiting factor. 106 The Court felt the term would be moot if 
it could be applied to any member of the general public who specifi­
cally was harmed, yet it is now moot because only those plaintiffs 
specifically delineated by the statutory language can achieve especial 
status under this definition. This treatment loses the focus and 
defeats the inquiry, which was to determine if one may imply the 
provisions of the statute to nonexpress parties. Implication analysis, 
by its nature, must deal with nonexpress factors. The especial test 
arose as an aid in this determination. Yet the Court's sharply de­
fined focus seems to preclude satisfaction of the especial test by 
non express parties. The factor should no longer be a part of the 
Court's inquiry under these restraints, or it should be reevaluated in 
light of the impossible hurdle it presents to plaintiffs seeking rights 
by implication. 
Sierra Club, after discounting any satisfaction of the first Cort 
factor, proceeded to deal with the second Cort factor: Whether there 
is any explicit or implicit indication of legislative intent to create or 
deny a cause of action. 107 Due to the statutory silence on this issue, 
the Court concluded that there were no indicia to hold definitively 
either way. 108 The Court interpreted this silence on the remedy ques­
tion as a confirmation that Congress, in enacting the Act, did not 
concern itself with private remedies but merely was responding to 
Willamette Iron Bridge 109 by designing a statute that enabled the 
government to respond to obstructions on navigable waterways. The 
conclusion arguably is fair in light of the paucity of legislative his­
105. A nearly identical statute was before the Court in Allen v. State Bd. of Elec­
tions, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) where a. private right of action was held to exist under the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973j(f). 393 U.s. at 555. While not couching the 
plaintiffs there as 'especial' beneficiaries, the right of action was still implied. The Allen 
plaintiffs, according to the Sierra Club Court, would then be merely beneficiaries of the 
statute's proscriptions. Thus, the threat of having the term become meaningless is merely 
an exercise in labels. 
106. 451 U.S. at 294. 
107. 451 U.S. at 295-96. 
108. Id. at 298. The court of appeals indicated that neither they nor the district 
court could conclusively ascertain intent to create or deny a private right of action from 
the act. Sierra Club v. Andrus, 610 F.2d 581, 588 (9th Cir. 1979), rev'd sub nom., Califor­
nia v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981). 
109. See notes 46-53 supra and accompanying text. 
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tory concerning the issue; 110 but the notion that a private action ex­
ists cannot be discredited when one realizes that, with this same 
legislative history available to them, the district and appellate courts 
in Sierra Club, were quite willing to imply a right of action. II I 
With the unwillingness to find that either of the first two Cort 
factors could be satisfied, the inquiry ended, as this failure was held 
to be dispositive. I 12 The opinion, therefore, never reached the third 
and fourth factors of the Cort analysis: Whether it is consistent with 
the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a 
remedy for the plaintiff; and, whether the cause is one traditionally 
relegated to state law making a solely federal action inappropriate. 
This is a further indication of the inconsistency being exhibited by 
the Court.113 One is thus presented with a situation in which the 
factors of Cort are analyzed religiously; 114 applied nonuniformly, re­
sulting in unequal weighting of some over others; 115 or disre­
garded. 116 This pragmatism and apparently result-oriented 
approachll7 was made apparent by Justice Stevens in his concurring 
opinion. I IS Although he joined the opinion of Justice White, Justice 
Stevens wrote a separate concurrence in which he expressed the view 
that it was more important to adhere to the analytic approach fol­
lowed by the Court regarding the availability of a private cause of 
action under section 10 of the Act than to foll.ow his own opinion 
that Congress intended to imply a private remedy. In another con­
curring opinion, Justice Rehnquist displayed a near mistrust of the 
Cort factors and stated that the focus of the analysis simply should 
be to dete~e legislative intent. 119 
The Cort factors, if they exist,120 at best have become merely an 
elemental aid to determine congressional intent to answer the impli­
cation question, and not a specific analysis to determine the actual 
110. 451 u.s. at 295. 
Ill. See Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967) (where a 
right of action was found under the Act, albeit under a different section). 
112. 451 U.S. at 298. 
113. See notes 91-97 supra and accompanying text. 
114. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979). 

liS. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979). 

116. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979). 
117. See note 2 supra and accompanying text. 
118. 451 U.S. at 298-301 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
119. Id. at 301. See note 101 supra. This visible mistrust of Cort is evidenced by 
Justice Rehnquist's feeling that too much emphasis was given to the test. The notion is 
further evidenced by the statement, "the so-called Cort factors are merely guides in the 
central task of ascertaining legislative intent." 451 U.S. at 302 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
120. See notes 91-97 supra and accompanying text. 
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existence of a right of action. Though the difference ostensibly is a 
semantic subtlety, its affect has allowed the Court to further its con­
servative trend in this area of the law. In structuring the inquiry so 
that the Cort factors are used as an aid in discerning legislative in­
tent, the Court may come down on either side of any statute before 
it. A determination of legislative intent can effectively reduce to 
pulling the rabbit out of whatever hat best fits a particular philo­
sophical approach. 121 Structuring the inquiry to legislative intent ef­
fectively eliminates three of the four Cort factors. The Cort test had 
a specific element to accommodate the legislative intent inquiry.122 
The Sierra Club Court allowed that one factor effectively to subsume 
the other three factors. While it is arguable that the first and third 
Cod factors are closely related to the legislative intent inquiry, there 
is no genuine basis for finding factor four to be interwoven with leg­
islative history in order to create or deny a cause of action. 123 
B. 	 Express Statutory Authority as an Alternative to Implied Rights 
ofAction .. 
The district and appellate courts in Sierra Club, after reaching 
the merits, held that the California Water Project violated the permit 
requirements of section 10 of the Act. 124 The Supreme Court, how­
ever, avoided reaching the merits by its holding. Thus,' at the very 
least, a strong probability existed that a statutory violation had oc­
curred. The Attorney General would not pursue the cause; thus, the 
Sierra Club was faced with the task of having the case adjudicated 
on the merits, a task rendered impossible under the implied rights' of 
action doctrine. 
A legal avenue available to plaintiffs surfaced in Maine v. 
Thiboutot. 125 The Court in Thiboutot held that section 1983 126 pro­
vides a remedy for any federal statutory violation,127 and that the 
prevailing party in a section 1983 action may recover attorney's 
fees. 128 Thus, plaintiffs in Sierra Club ostensibly could have used the 
121. 	 See 451 U.S. at 301 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
122. Factor two of the Corl test asks whether there is "any indication of legislative 
intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or deny one?" 422 U.S. at 78. 
123. Factor four of the Corl test asks whether "the cause of action [is] one tradi­
tionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it 
would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?" Id. 
124. 	 See notes 22-25 supra and accompanying text. 
125. 	 448 U.S. I (1980). 
126. 	 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). 
127. 	 448 U.S. at 4-8. 
128. 	 Id. at 8-11. 
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express grants of section 1983 as a remedial vehicle for pursuing 
their alleged statutory violations, an alternative pleading to their at­
tempts at establishing an implied right of action under the ACt. 129 
Thiboutot rendered section 1983 applicable to rights secured by 
the Constitution and by all federal laws, specifically the Social Se­
curity Act (SSA),130 and rejected assertions that it was limited to 
constitutional and civil rights statutory violations. Congressional in­
tent advocates had defined the scope of section 1983 to confine it to 
remedies for violations of rights guaranteed by the Constitution or 
by civil rights statutes. 13I Proponents choosing to interpret the plain 
meaning of the statute construed it to grant a cause of action for 
deprivation of rights under any federal statute. 132 Justice Brennan, 
writing for the Thiboutot majority, found that because the language 
of the statute was unambiguous and because no modifiers were at­
tached to the words in question, the meaning of section 1983 should 
be construed to encompass the protection of all federal statutory 
rights. 133 Finally, the Court held that because the SSA did not pro­
129. When this proposition was suggested to the attorneys who represented the 
Sierra Club, it was their feeling that Thiboutot's holding went only to establishing the 
right to attorney's fee via section 1983 and not to that section's providing of a remedial 
vehicle for alleged federal statutory violations. 
The Tltiboutot Court, however, could not have reached the attorney's fee issue 
without first holding that section 1983 did, in fact, provide a cause of action for federal 
statutory violations. For a discussion of the specific attorney's fee issue under section 
1983, see Wolf, Pendent Jurisdiction, Multi-Claim Litigation, and the 1976 Civil Rights 
AI/orney's Fees Awards Act, 2 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 193 (1979). 
130. 42 U.S.c. §§ 601-610 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), as amended by Technical Cor­
rections Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-222, 94 Stat. 194 (1980); Social Security Disability 
Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-265,94 Stat. 441; Adoption Assistance and Child 
Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272 94 Stat. 500. 
131. Those restricting the scope of section 1983 via congressional intent, do so by 
citing Reconstruction Era legislative history. This view was expounded upon by Justice 
Powell in his dissent in Thiboutot. See note 132 infra and accompanying text. 
132. The dissent took issue with the Court's plain meaning stance by arguing that 
if section 1983 encompassed all federal statutory violations, the disjurictive "or" should 
have fallen between "Constitution" and "laws." The dissent further argued, based on 
Reconstruction Era legislative history, that a natural reading of the statute required that 
the asserted federal rights be secured by both the Constitution and the laws of the United 
States, limiting the scope of section 1983 to civil rights or equal protection laws. 448 U.S. 
at II (Powell, J., dissenting). 
133. The Court cited as precedent for this interpretation, Edelman v. Jordan, 415 
U.S. 651,675 (1974) (citing Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970». Rosado held that 
suits in federal court under section 1983 are proper to secure compliance with the provi­
sions of the Social Security Act on the part of participating states, Rosado v. Wyman, 397 
U.S: 397,422 (1970); see also Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 239 it.30 (1972); Lynch v. 
Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 543 n.7 (1972) (section 1983's predecessor "was 
enlarged to provide protection for rights, privileges, or immunities secured by federal 
law"); Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 829-30 (1966) (state "officers may be made 
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vide for a private right of action, plaintiff, out of necessity, had to 
proceed under section 1983.134 
In light of Thiboutot and the recent unwillingness of the Court 
to imply private rights of action, it appears that the Sierra Club 
might have fared better pleading its cause of action under section 
1983 as a remedial statute to reach the merits of its allegations under 
the Act. 135 
A recent decision may shed some light on the availability of 
section 1983 in such a situation. In Middlesex County Sewerage Au­
thority v. National Sea Clammers Association ,136 a class action was 
brought by a fisherman and an association of shell fishermen against 
various federal, state, and local officials for alleged violations of the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972 137 and the Marine Pro­
tection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972. 138 Justice Powell, 
writing for the Supreme Court, held that neither statute provided a 
private right of action, and one would not be implied. 139 This con­
clusion was reached following a determination of congressional in­
tent to prohibit judicial implication of a cause of action. The 
scenario thus far, is familiar and similar to Sierra Club. In Sea 
Clammers, however, the Court raised the issue of whether section 
1983 would provide a remedial vehicle that would allow express au­
thorization to bring suit under the statutes, sua sponte. 140 The Court 
reasoned that it was appropriate to reach the issue of the applicabil­
. ity of section 1983 because if section 1983 controlled, it would obvi­
ate the need for implication analysis. 141 The issue was raised sua 
sponte, because Thiboutot was decided after the litigation in Sea 
Clammers .142 
to respond in damages not only for violations of rights conferred by federal equal civil 
rights laws, but for violations of other federal constitutional or statutory rights as well"); 
Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 525 (1939) (section 1983 protects "rights, privileges, and 
immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States"). 
134. 448 U.S. at 4-8. 
135. Certiorari for Sierra Club was filed, February 13, 1980. Thiboutot was handed 
down on June 25,1980. Certiorari in Sierra Club was granted on October 6, California v. 
Sierra Club, 449 U.S. 818 (1981), and the case was decided on April 21, 1981. The Sierra 
Club thus could have moved the Court to have the certiorari petition amended under 
suggestion to vacate and remand the case in light of Thiboutot. 
136. 453 U.S. I (1981). 
137. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976). 
138. Id. §§ 1401-1444 (1976). 
139. 453 U.S. at 14-15. 
140. Id. at 19. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. 
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In Sea Clammers, the Court reiterated two exceptions to the 
application of section 1983 to statutory violations, 143 First was 
"whether Congress had forclosed private enforcement of the statute 
in the enactment itself, and [second), whether the statute at issue was 
the kind that (created enforceable rights) under section 1983."144 
Thus, in Sierra Club, the focus of the inquiry concerning these ex­
ceptions would be the comprehensiveness of the express enforcement 
mechanisms provided in the Act, and a detemiination of whether the 
prohibition of the obstruction of navigable waters put forth in the 
Act actually secures a right to the maintenance of the navigability of 
waters. 
The Court in Sea C1ammers held that both statutes provided 
extensive and comprehensive express enforcement mechanisms and 
thus came under the first exception in section 1983 analysis. 145 
Therefore, no implied right of action was recognized nor was any 
remedy that otherwise would be available under section 1983 cogni­
zable because such remedies would be supplanted by these compre­
hensive statutory schemes. 146 
The same reasons that persuaded the Court to raise the section 
1983 issue in Sea C1ammers existed in Sierra Club. The Sierra Club 
had commenced suit prior to Thiboutot. Resolving the section 1983 
issue as providing an express remedial statute for alleged federal 
statutory violations, as in Thiboutot, also would have obviated the 
need to proceed through an implied right of action analysis in Sierra 
Club. In light of these factors, the failure of the Court to raise the 
section 1983 issue sua sponte in Sierra Club becomes a point of criti­
cal interest. This is further highlighted in that Sierra Club preceeded 
Sea Clammers. 
One plausible explanation, almost unavojdable under the cur­
rent tenor of the Court, is that the ultimate aim in all of these recent 
machinations of implied right of action analysis is a basic policy de­
sire to limit access to federal COUrts. 147 Consistent with this policy is 
the current constriction of the implied right of action doctrfue and 
the use of standing and ~usticiability to further limit access to the 
federal courtS. I48 While this policy could be attained readily in Sea 
143. The two exceptions were recognized in Pennhurst State School and Hosp. v. 
Haldeman, 451 U.S. 1,28 (1981). . 
144. 453 U.S. at 19. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. at 21. 
147. See note 2 supra and accompanying text. 
148. Id. 
729 1982] FEDERAL LAW 
Clammers, it would have been far more difficult to dismiss the sec­
tion 1983 issue had it been researched, briefed, and argued in Sierra 
Club. 
Neither of the two exceptions that were set forth in Sea Clam­
mers to preclude proceeding under a section 1983 analysis were 
readily applicable in Sierra Club. Alternatively, any allegation of 
their applicability was readily rebuttable. The basic premise estab­
lished in Thiboutot concerned the applicability of section 1983 as a 
remedial statute to reach alleged federal statutory violations. 149 The 
refinement of that doctrine in Sea Clammers placed two categories of 
limitations on section 1983 analysis in this context.iso A hindsight 
view of what might have happened in Sierra Club had section 1983 
been pleaded, therefore, is appropriate. 
Thiboutot held that section 1983 provides a remedy for colora­
ble . state violations of any statutorily secured federal right.ISI Sea 
Clammers emphasized that the limits to a section 1983 action 
brought pursuant to an alleged federal statutory violation could be 
found in two exceptions. The first exception was when Congress had 
foreclosed private enforcement in the enactment itself. The second 
was whether the statute at issue was one that created enforceable 
rights under section 1983. IS2 
Asserting the basic premise of Thiboutot, plaintiffs in Sierra 
Club could have pleaded that the California Water Project's actions 
were in violation of the permit requirements of section 9 and 10 of 
the ACt. IS3 Further, because of this alleged violation by the state and 
because the Act neither expresses nor denies a private right of action, 
plaintiffs could have used section 1983 as express statutory authority 
to redress this "color of state law" action. On the precedent of 
Thiboutot, the remedial aspects of section 1983 would have provided 
an avenue of redress allowing the courts to hear the merits of the 
allegation. 
As noted earlier, however, the basic doctrine of Thiboutot has 
been qualified by two exceptions. These exceptions were used by the 
Sea Clammers Court to deny the applicability of section 1983 to 
149. See notes 125-33 supra and accompanying text. 
ISO. See notes 136-46 supra and accompanying text. 
lSI. The Eighth Circuit does not read Thiboulol in such unqualified terms. In 
First Nat'l Bank v. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 636 F.2d 195 (8th Cir. 1980), the court u.£held 
the dismissal of a section 1983 claim based on the National Bank Act, 12 U.s.c. §§ 21­
2Sb (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
152. See notes 143-46 supra and accompanying text. 
153. See notes 8-21 supra and accompanying text. 
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plaintiffs. 154 Therefore, it would have been necessary for the Sierra 
Club to show that the two exceptions were inapplicable to its action. 
If it could have demonstrated this, the merits of its case would have 
been reached by the Supreme Court. Moreover, unlike Sea Clam­
mers, the statute in Sierra Club was not amenable to classification in 
either of the two exceptions. Thus Sierra Club was a much more 
interesting case than Sea Clammers, which could be adapted sum­
marily to the comprehensiveness exception. That is, Congress had 
foreclosed private enforcement because of the comprehensiveness of 
the enactment itself. In Sierra Club, the Act was not comprehensive 
in the sense of providing an extensive enforcement scheme. The re­
quirements of the enforcement scheme only provided that the Attor­
ney General may . enforce the provisions of the permit requirements .. 
There was no administrative procedure to exhaust prior to the com­
mencement of suit. Thus, there were no requirements of a compre­
hensive enforcement procedure that would have been bypassed if 
suit had been brought directly under section 1983. Avoidance of 
comprehensive procedures is the action that the Court tried to pre­
vent in the first exception to the availability of section 1983. There­
fore, the principles that underlie the first exception to the availability 
of section 1983 were not found in Sierra Club. 
The Court in Sea Clammers did not reach the second exception 
to the applicability of section 1983; whether the statute created en­
forceable rights. 155 Plaintiffs in Sierra Club, however, would have 
had to prove that the Act did create enforceable rights. This could 
be accomplished by asserting that plaintiffs had a right not to have 
navigable waters impeded. This right would stem from the line of 
cases which gave rise to the enactments finally crystallized by the 
ACt. 156 Arguably, it can be stated that the Act creates a substantive 
right in the federal government alone to have its navigable waters 
unimpeded. It is beyond the scope of this note to deal with the full 
range of substantive rights created by specific legislation. The point 
simply is that had the Sierra Club pleaded section 1983 as an alter­
native to implied right of action theory, a detailed analysis of this 
specific exception may have persuaded the Court that a substantive 
federal right was created by the Act,157 thereby removing the excep­
154. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 
1 (1981). 
ISS. /d. at 19. 
156. See note 46 supra and accompanying text. 
157. A case which seemingly points up the possibility of the Sierra Club's success 
in pleading section 1983 is Yapalater v. Bates, 494 F. Supp. 1349 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). Refer­
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tions as obstacles. 
The thrust of this hypothetical simply is that, in light of 
Thiboutot and in spite of the qualifications set forth in Sea Clam­
mers, the chances of dismissing a section 1983 action in Sierra Club 
were considerably less than in Sea Clammers, wherein the statutes 
involved were clearly comprehensive in their particularized enforce­
ment mechanisms. Why the Court chose not to deal with the issue in 
Sierra Club is· a matter of speculation, but, at the very least, it would 
have been far more difficult to dismiss the claim in Sierra Club than 
it was in Sea Clammers. This further indicates the lack of uniform­
ity in the Court's current attitude toward implied rights of action. 
Not only is the Court restricting the availability of the doctrine, but 
it also is discouraging the use of collateral doctrines in which the 
purpose basically is to accomplish the same objective; to force the 
Court to reach the merits of alleged statutory violations. 
The effect of raising the section 1983 issue, sua sponte, in Sea 
Clammers, where it easily could be disposed of is to weaken the 
cause of action by indicating that section 1983 is not a blanket grant 
of express statutory authority for reaching all alleged statutory viola­
tions. Had the issue been pleaded properly in Sierra Club, however, 
a potential source of access to federal courts may have become avail­
able to environmental groups for alleged violation of federal statutes 
similar to the Act. As this apparently would be contrary to the pres­
ent posture of the Court concerning access to federal courts, the 
Court could not have raised the issue in Sierra Club, sua sponte, due 
to the tenuous nature of its ability to dismiss the claim. The net 
effect is to leave plaintiffs in a difficult position on whether section 
1983 will be preferable in their efforts at persuading a court to reach 
the merits of claims based on statutes that contain no real compre­
hensive enforcement mechanisms nor any discernible legislative in­
tent either to imply or deny a private right of action. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
To prevent actions by private citizens to redress statutory viola­
tions, because of a pervasive policy of limiting access to federal 
courts, is to make a serious error. While e.asy access may encourage 
ring to Thiboufof, the court stated: ''The precise effect of rhiboUfof is to create a remedy 
where. . . injury flows from a state's violation of governing federal law in a joint fed­
eral-state cooperative program. If those elements are present, section 1983 provides the 
private remedy ...." Id. at 1358. Had Sierra Club pleaded as hypothicated here, its 
claim would have been on all fours with this interpretation of Thiboufof and its private 
suit would have been allowed. 
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frivolous suits and certainly will increase the burden upon the fed­
eraljudiciary, a policy that restricts access through a stricter implica­
tion doctrine, combined with a relative unwillingness to extend the 
remedial provisions of section 1983 beyond civil rights and constitu­
tional challenges,158 effectively allows known violators of federal 
statutes to avoid the proscriptions of those statutes. This was stated 
emphatically in California v. Sierra Club. 159 Cort v. Ash 160 provided 
a multifactor balancing test to determine whether to imply a private 
right of action. By itself, this represents a retreat from the liberal 
tenets of the Borak- Wyandotte era,161 and is sufficient to place the 
Court in the middle ground of making the federal courts available. 
While Cort was not nearly as restrictive as Sierra Club, the mul­
tifactor balancing test generally tends to produce negative answers. 
Cort thus struck some balance between the earlier liberal decisions 
and the recent conservative decisions that rely solely on congres­
sional intent. A dangerous restriction occurs when Cort can be re­
duced to merely an indicative test for legislative intent, as it has been 
done in recent decisions. If the Court continues to give a mere per­
functory nod to the'Cort factors,162 the need for a liberal stance con­
cerning the remedial features of section 1983 is apparent as a 
counterbalance to the restrictiveness of a legislative intent inquiry. 
In the final analysis, the courts must follow a basic tenet that, "[i]f 
there be an admitted wrong, the courts will look far to supply an 
adequate remedy." 163 The result in Sierra C1t(b was not an adequate 
remedy. A district and appellate court both held that a violation of a 
federal statute had occurred. The Supreme Court's ability to fore­
close the merits of the case through restrictive implied right of action 
158. A recent case, however, held that Corl was not only alive and well, but in 
proceeding through the Corl analysis, an implied private right of action was found to 
exist. Garrity v. Gallen, 522 F. Supp. 171 (D.N.H. 1981) (implied right of action exists 
under the Developmentally Disabled Assistance Bill of Rights which enables private per­
sons to compel the termination of federal funds to a state that violates the Bill of Rights' 
conditions). Despite the fact that the plaintHrs had pleaded section 1983 in the alterna­
tive to implying a right of action, the court held that because it was willing to imply a 
private remedy, it need not approach the section 1983 issue. q: Texas Indus. v. Radcliff 
Materials, 451 U.S. 630, 639 (1981) (relying on Congressional intent factor but noting the 
existence of the other Corl factors). 
159. 451 U.S. 287 (1981). 
160. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). 
161. See notes 60-68 supra and accompanying text. 
162. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. 1,25 
(1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
163. DeLima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. I, 176-77 (1900). 
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analysis demonstrates the need for an alternative right of action 
under section 1983. 
. Sheldon Ananian 
